system" will have morphed to accommodate the new reality. But the transformation will be incomplete and uneven." 4 In other words, for the future of the international system one may discern roughly two possible trajectories: either the multiplicity of actors will strengthen the international system for a global public domain to emerge, 5 or this multiplicity will contribute to the further fragmentation of the international system and undermine international cooperation and global governance institutions. The diversification of both state and non-state powers (into multipolarity and into multiplicity) increases the likelihood of the second scenario and complicates working towards realisation of the first. "The need for effective global governance
[of the pressing transnational problems such as climate change, regulation of globalized financial markets, migration, failing states, crime networks, etc] will increase faster than existing mechanisms can respond." 6 In short, we are faced with a real risk that further dispersion of power and authority will contribute to a weakening of the institution of international law and to a growing global governance deficit. The international legal system and global institutions need to adapt to the new global reality, of which NSA power and influence is such a dominant feature. I deliberately use the words power and influence --this is what NSAs have and this is the reason why political scientists and IR and IL scholars are interested. We are dealing with actors that have sufficient autonomy and power to exercise influence on the international stage. Unsurprisingly, one of the central characteristics of our times is that power and influence are less based on territory and more based on network, information, knowledge, and function. Next to hard power, we now find soft power, the power to convince (or in Nye's words, the power to influence through attraction, and thanks to a capacity for effective communication) rather than to coerce.
7
Global Trends 2025 is not the first and surely not the only report to identify possible challenges and opportunities of the near future, 8 but the report's explicitness stimulates strategic thinking about (policy) interventions in developments that may cause a growing deficit of accountability/responsibility, a lack of governance at the global level, and the possible weakening of the international legal order. This once again provokes our discipline to deal with the topic of NSAs, their role in shaping international life and their position in a rapidly changing global 4 Ibidem, at 81. 5 Ruggie goes as far as to argue that "the newly emerging global public domain" is a public domain which is no longer coterminous with the system of states, the latter is actually becoming increasingly embedded in a "non-statebased public domain." J.G. Ruggie, Reconstructing the Global Public Domain -Issues, Actors, and Practices, …, at 519. 6 Global Trends 2025, at 81. 7 See also David Held et al., Global Transformations (Oxford: Polity, 1999), at 447: 'we must recognize that political power is being repositioned, recontextualised and, to a degree, transformed by the growing importance of other less territorially based power systems." 8 Ibidem, at 85.
(institutional) order. And, at a time in which the international community is committed to strengthening the international rule of law, this contribution also addresses the growing power of NSAs as a potentially undermining factor.
In that context the present chapter argues the inclusion of powerful, international NSAs in the category of 'international legal persons.' 9 The argument builds on the generally accepted idea that for the purpose of both the protection and the accountability of entities within the international legal system, these should have the enhanced status of legal 'subject' rather than 'object'. Behind this legal reality lies the normative reality of the international rule of law ideal:
powerful entities that operate to some degree independently on the international plane should be controlled by law and held accountable for their actions. In other words: political or economic actors should be visible also in the international legal order (section 2). After these preliminary propositions, this chapter examines if and how the international legal personality (ILP) of NSAs may be constructed today. I distinguish three ways in which the ILP of NSAs is construed within the parameters of the conventional conception of ILP: a) 'transnational ILP', b) 'soft ILP', and c)
'regular ILP' (section 3). The chapter proceeds, however, to search for a new grounding of ILP theory. This search is supported by the general dissatisfaction with the formal conception of ILP, which draws on fiction theory. I will suggest to reconsider the 'real personality' theory or 'realist' theory of international legal personality (section 4). This theory reconnects to the non-or pre-legal realms -of political and social sciences, ethics, psychology, metaphysics etc. -that were cut off from the legal concept of international personality in the past. This chapter aims to provoke debate on the possibility of a 'new' realist theory so that we may be better equipped when addressing questions of NSAs and international law. In doing so it also aims to build an argument against the popular conviction that the concept of ILP and its theory has flopped. It defends the view that ILP is relevant and useful in today's international legal reality, provided that a new theoretical grounding is developed.
Preliminary propositions a. Based on their social, political and economic subjectivity, NSAs should be legal subjects, not objects
This chapter proceeds from two preliminary claims or propositions. The first is that because
NSAs are such important powers in the political and social reality of today's world, it is necessary that they are considered actors in the legal reality as well. 'Legal personality' then is the status which "enables an entity to function in a legal order." 10 Being a 'legal person' or 'subject' of international law better captures today's NSA's role than being an 'object' of international law. This is not an attempt to get back into the prison house, 11 or to disregard Koskenniemi's fair critique of the object/subject dichotomy. 12 It is merely an effort to be clear on the underlying proposition of this chapter: in the confusion about whether to "relativiz[e] the subjects" or to "subjectivize the actors" this chapter is inclined to do the latter. 13 The dichotomy may be an obstacle at times, but that doesn't mean that international law is unlike any other legal system in that it can do without the notion of legal personality. The global reality of NSAs operating on the international plane however can no longer be ignored. Considering the discrepancy between the de jure conception of the non-state actor, which basically amounts to that of an object of international law, and the de facto global socio-political and legal role of powerful, rational, and purposeful NSAs, it is time to change the position of the non-state actor in international law. Moreover, as Jan Klabbers has rightly pointed out, international legal personality or "[s]ubjectivity" is "both declarative and constitutive." 14 Or, to emphasize its crucial important by means of Klabbers' words: "subjects doctrine forms the clearing house between sources and substance: it is through subjects doctrine that the international allocation of values takes place, and as any political scientist knows, the authoritative allocation of values is one of the main political functions." Jan Klabbers, ( In a vision of an international rule of law NSAs, as powerful governing and governed actors, should therefore be conceptualized as ILPs.
(i). The Rule of Law at the international level
Here, focus is on what is meant by "the international level" when dealing with the conceptualisation of the RoL at this level. In the next paragraph, we will deal with the RoL concept as such.
The conceptualisation of the International Rule of Law (IRoL) -here taken as synonymous with "the rule of law at the international level" -is going through a revival in practice and theory. In the first decades of the last century as well, the IRoL received much scholarly attention. Back then, between the two World Wars in particular, this attention was related to the attack on the late nineteenth century 'idolatry of the state', the reduction of To underpin the proposition that the IRoL requires the ILP of international NSAs, I make three claims.
i) The RoL is a political ideal, the beneficiaries of which are human individuals also in the international context. From this follows that all international 'governing actors' (that is :
actors involved in a form of global governance) are subjected to international law, whether state or non-state. 57 The same is true for UN reports, which conceive of the international rule of law as governance values but without concern for NSAs position. ii) The RoL ideal is perhaps best known for placing governing actors under the law, protecting individuals in a 'vertical' relationship. However, we should not forget the RoL equally addresses 'horizontal' relationships, stipulating that all actors, governing and non-governing, are subject to the law. The RoL presupposes the 'rule by law' -the idea that law governs society. It moreover envisions a legal order which covers the entire social order with its acts and actors. Thus, when we aim to apply the RoL to the international level, this arguably entails a claim that the international order operates on an international law to which all actors, governing and non-governing, state and non-state, are bound. The second claim recalls that the RoL exists on the basis of the prerequisite that there is law, that law is created and enforced, that a public legal order exists which addresses every (significant) 65 It does explain however the fact that the RoL features at all governance levels (domestic, international and in between) of multilevel governance analysis. See for the rule of law "in between," André Nollkaemper, The ), para. 6: "The rule of law is a concept at the very heart of the Organization's mission. It refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decisionmaking, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency." entity within that order. It is worth recalling that the RoL ideal has developed within the European domestic power structures of the last few centuries. This was a time of state-building,
i.e. a period of the centralisation of power, the monopolisation of force, and the supremacy of public order over private power. In other words, the RoL idea developed in societies where a 'rule of man by law' already existed. This was a context in which ruler or government (theoretically) had to serve the people, to uphold the law, to secure social peace, and thus to protect the individual against the unlawful use of power by members of society. Hence, the most important power from which an individual would need to be protected was public or governmental power. The governed, on the other hand, were already subject to the law and thus theoretically protected from each other by the law.
In the development of the definition(s) of the RoL, much emphasis has been placed on limitation of governing power by law to the benefit of human individuals. Although the RoL ideal may have been specifically geared to constraining the power of governing actors, it also binds non-governing actors in their relationship with one another. The RoL essentially proceeds from the idea that all actors, governing and non-governing, are subject to the law.
In part this is a normative claim inherent to the IRoL ideal: the catalogue of actors subjected to international law is thus expanded to include international NSAs so that their (mostly non-governing) powers, too, are constrained for the protection of human dignity and individual autonomy. Reading the 2005 World Summit Outcome document with this in mind, the sentence "the theory of the rule of law demands that actors exercising public authority be subject to the law," 69 may be completed with "just as all other actors are subject to the law." It is a reality of present-day international society that some internationally operating NSAs are more powerful than some states. Hence, to be true to the ideal and effective in pursuing its objective (the protection of individual dignity and autonomy against arbitrary and unjust use of -governing and non-governing -power) the IRoL requires the subjection of state and NSAs to the law. of law as a mere concept is not enough. New laws must be put into place, old ones must be put into practice and our institutions must be better equipped to strengthen the rule of law."
Construing ILP for NSAs may be such an innovation. As this would constitute a further link between the factual actor and the law, it would enable the rule of law to play its ordering role and to guide the conduct of all social international actors in the international arena.
The third claim is that if the essence of the RoL ideal is protection of the individual against the arbitrary and unjust use of -governing or non-governing -power by any international actor, it follows that the RoL ideal has at least some substantive content, a minimum level of justice. In other words, the RoL ideal also has a substantive dimension. As set out above, the commitment to a stronger IRoL raises a claim for an international law that protects human individuals against infringements of their dignity and autonomy by governing actors as well as globally operating influential private actors or NSAs. This is not a neutral objective. Fuller argued indeed that the rule of law is 'a moral good', because of the aforementioned objective. But then again, a moral good such as the enhancement of individual autonomy can be nurtured by a set of procedural requirements of the law (generality, predictability, degree of certainty, nulla poena, etc.) only, i.e. the formal conception of rule of law. This line of argument explains Raz's statement A non-democratic legal system, based on the denial of human rights, on extensive poverty, on racial segregation, sexual inequalities, and religious persecution may, in principle, conform to the requirements of the rule of law better than any of the legal systems of the more enlightened western democracies. This does not mean that it will be better than those western democracies. It will be an immeasurably worse legal system, but it will excel in one respect: in its conformity to the rule of law. 73 This is part of an extremely positivist position on law. I would argue that Raz's position in fact runs contrary to the RoL ideal. In defending Radbruch's formula that 'extreme injustice is no law' in discussions with Raz, Robert Alexy has established that there is "an utmost limit" to certainty 71 At a 2009 UN Expert Meeting on the Rule of Law, David Kennedy pointed out that "global governance and the international rule of law are about more than management and problem solving. They concern the structure and ends of our global political life. As a result, in building the global legal order, we must grasp the depth of the injustice of the world today and the urgency of change. … … Revitalizing the international rule of law is to remake the forms and channels of global political life. My own hope is that we carry the revolutionary force of social justice and the democratic promise -of individual rights, of economic self-sufficiency, of citizenship, of community empowerment, and participation in the decisions that affect one's life ---to the sites of global and transnational authority, however local they may be. 77 In Dworkin's reinterpretation, this means that the RoL includes individual rights: "the second conception of the rule of law [is called] the 'rights' conception. It is in several ways more ambitious than the rule-book conception. It assumes that citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to one another and political rights against the state as a whole. It insists that these moral and political rights be recognizes in positive law, so that they may be enforced upon the demand of individual citizens through courts or other judicial institutions of the familiar type, so far as this is practicable. The rule of law on this conception is the ideal of rule by an accurate public conception of individual rights. It does not distinguish, as the rule-book conception does, between the rule of law and substantive justice; on the contrary it requires, as part of the ideal of law, that the rules in the rule book capture and enforce moral rights." Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 11-12.
Even from these few points it seems fair to say that the rule of law within international society raises a claim for inclusion of all governing and non-governing powers of the international society in order to prevent any powerful, globally operating actor from being outside or 'above' international law. How else can the IRoL be upheld while a considerable degree of power is shifting away from states to NSAs? An international legal system with blind spots for powerful actors contributes to a weakening of the IRoL. The concept of ILP contributes to the IRoL by functioning as a linchpin between the factual and the legal, by bringing actual power under the law. 78 The IRoL prescribes international law to rule supremely, and the tool of ILP connects
NSAs to international law. Proceeding from here, it is now time to examine how to develop the reconstitution of NSAs as international legal persons.
Conventional approaches to ILP 79 -shortcomings and opportunities
Unlike most domestic legal systems, international law lacks the rules to stipulate which are the system's legal persons. There is no "Vienna Convention on the law of international legal However, no positive international law catalogue of legal persons exists. This may be a shortcoming as well as an opportunity.
In the absence of black letter law, doctrine and practice cover up controversy by quoting from the Court's 1949 Advisory Opinion:
[Being an international person] does not even imply that all its rights and duties must be upon the international plane, any more than all the rights and duties of a State must be upon that plane. What it does mean is that it is a subject of international law capable of possessing international rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.
The dictum of which this passage is part, In other words, together with the formal conception of ILP there is another view on ILP at work which is determined by the political outlook on international law. When ILP is defined as 'bearing rights and duties under international law', ILP is inferred from the international rights and duties borne by a particular actor. ILP then "merely is an ex post qualification on the basis of apparently performed legal acts." However, at the same time ILP in relation to some actors is used as "a threshold -proceeding from an established catalogue of international legal subjects, which keeps actors from being considered as a subject of international law regardless of their actions at the international plane." 93 If not a priori included in the catalogue, an actor does not have ILP, and neither can it obtain ILP on the basis of actual doings in the international arena.
This 'threshold approach' -international law a priori stipulating or withholding legal personality for a specific actor -seems to explain the legal practice with regard to some NSAs, notably As to the source of ILP, Oppenheim's approach -the international legal person emerges through the explicit or implicit attribution of ILP by international law (to states primarily) -has remained the standard well into the 20 th century. 93 Brölmann, op cit note 10, at 69-70. 94 Ibidem, at 70. 95 In 1932, Hans Kelsen argued at the Hague Academy: "Comme tout droit, le droit international est …, lui aussi, une réglementation de la conduite humaine. C'est à l'homme que s'adressent les normes du droit international, c'est contre l'homme qu'elles dirigent la contrainte, c'est aux hommes qu'elles remettent le soin de créer l'ordre. … La "personne" en tant que sujet de droits et d'obligations n'est que l'expression personnifié de l'unité d'un système de normes réglementant des actions humaines, de 'unité d'un ordre total (Etat) ou partiel (autres personnes juridiques et << personnes physiques>> In light of the growing influence of NSAs in international life and the (related) changing identity of international law, I see three ways in which currently ILP may be, and is, construed for NSAs. In all cases, the notion of legal personality is used in a rather conventional way -as a legal fiction -, but it is operationalized by 'new' international law (conceptions). Consequently, 'new' Scholarship that firmly upholds this definition of international law and aims to refrain from including non-state actors, the possession of a capacity to create international law is frequently added as a criterion to be fulfilled in order to be an international person. If one has an individualistic take on international law and aims at the inclusion of the individual as legal person in international law, the capacity to make law is not a requirement to be fulfilled. 100 P. Alston, The 'Not-a-Cat' Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in P. Alston (Ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (2005), at 21: "Various explanations might be suggested: an intrinsic lack of imagination; a natural affinity with the status quo; a deeply rooted professional commitment to internationalism, albeit one premised on the continuity of the system of sovereign equality; a reluctance to bite the hand that feeds; or simply the conviction that respect for that system has taken a great deal of time and human suffering to achieve and that it continues to offer a better prospect than any alternative that has so far been put forward." international legal persons are created. This is discussed in the following paragraphs a) on 'transnational ILP'; b) on 'soft ILP'; and c) on sufficient 'regular' ILP.
a. Transnational legal personality
Unsurprising for someone standing in the Yale school International Law as Process tradition, Rosalyn Higgins rejects the positivist subject-object dichotomy; it is without "credible reality" or "functional purpose." Higgens argues moreover that "[w]e have erected an intellectual prison of our own choosing and then declared it to be an unalterable constraint." 101 The inflexible subjectobject dichotomy of the positivist school is "unhelpful," both intellectually and operationally, she states, and many have repeated her words since. In her view international law has "only in judging whether that actor is included in the system of transnational law. 105 
b. Soft international legal personality?
Outside the 'law as process' school, certainly softness of international law is also an issue. The end of the binary opposition between international law as a system of 'hard' rules on the one hand and 'soft' international law on the other, 107 arguably leaves room also for a softer (version of) international legal personality. The general idea then is that for actors to be addressed by soft In this case, the introduction of a softer version of ILP for NSAs means a more adequate description of a serious normative development, i.e. soft law that addresses NSAs. 109 It is not "an artificial extension of the frontiers of international law" for the sake of mere scholarly pleasure.
It is worth developing our terminology so as to encompass also softer tones of 'legalness' and recognise that international law can have normative force also for actors which are not formally bound by a particular international norm, yet sometimes willing to comply; or that international normativity can be shaped by international documents which escape the binary structure of law, and obligations under positive international law (the prerequisite for ILP) and that under particular circumstances they have a capacity to be party to a claim. 123 From the established capacity to enjoy rights and obligations, it is then "only a short jump … to imagining that non- In conclusion, all of the abovementioned views in their approach of ILP and NSAs remain within the conventional parameters, based as they are on the understanding that international law creates ILP. Their difference lies primarily in the underlying conceptions of international law. At the same time, all three views show how hard it is in the current international constellation to keep the legal realm and the non-legal or social realm apart. In Koh's approach to international law as transnational legal process, the non-legal reality of 'influence' actually contributes to the emergence of ILP. In the next section, we will try and take it one step further; we will revisit the 'real personality' or 'realist theory' of ILP and explore its possibilities of offering a theoretical framework fitting to contemporary international life. here, I will briefly discuss the controversy that surrounded its eclipse.
The need for Grounding

a. On the controversy over realist theory of personality
Today's conventional use and definition of ILP is formally indifferent to the social reality bearing ILP. As mentioned, it draws on one of the two principal theories on the nature of legal persons, the fiction theory. On the other hand, the real personality or realist theory, which in brief holds that the legal person is not merely a legal fiction created by law but emerges from social facts, disappeared from both the municipal law debate and the international law debate in the early decades of the twentieth century. John Dewey's article The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality has been critical to the disappearance of the real personality theory in the context of the first debate. 130 The international law debate was basically decided around the same time.
Late nineteenth and early-twentieth century mainstream personality discourse focused on the State. For many, the ILP of the state had been firmly connected to a real personality of the State or at least to a pre-legal, factual existence of a state entity. 131 Gradually, leaving details aside, however, the understanding of both state personality and state 'will' as legal fictions came to dominate mainstream scholarship. Otto von Gierke's realist theory gave way to the fiction theory propagated by, for example, another German voluntarist and legal positivist, Georg Jellinek.
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International law is then seen as created by the fictitious will of sovereign states to apply a selfimposed order. States were the only subjects of international law, 133 safe one or two exceptions.
The international rule of law accordingly is weak -international law is law by states and not above states. 134 As such, it has failed to prevent world war and to constrain state power.
It may be kept in mind that in the nineteenth century, realist theory had emerged in a rather progressive context, and had aimed to contribute to the establishment of the responsibility of corporations. However, developed at that time as part of German jurisprudence, it was 132 Jellinek rejected the idea that legal personality could have its source in factual existence: legal persons come into being only by attribution of an entity by the legal order. The law determines which entity has legal personality, the factual existence of an entity, its nature, and properties belong to the world of (social) facts and not to the legal realm. Legal personality is established by the law and is a relation of the law with an entity irrespective of (the nature of) existence. In Jellink's view the state can only be bound by his own sovereign will, international law is created by Brierly, Kelsen, Lauterpacht, Politis, Scelle, to mention just a few of the anti-statist liberal IL scholars, repudiated collectivist and organic conceptions of the (international) legal personality of the state for having autocratic and anti-democratic tendencies. They noticed the dangers of the state as a "real corporate personality" -a (mysterious) super-entity with a will and life of its own -and thus adhered to (methodological) individualism. 139 The realist understanding of the international legal person has been considered methodologically and epistemologically as well as politically questionable ever since the early twentieth century. Rejection of this old version of realist theory of personality will not be disputed here. The human individual may never be a means to an end, nor merged into a collective subject at the expense of its identity and autonomy. The susceptibility of the 'old' realist theory to absolutist tendencies and the role it allegedly played in the dark history of our continent 143 are however related particularly to the version of the Hegelian scholar Otto von
Gierke. There is another version of the realist theory of personality, which also draws on Gierke, but which is less politically contaminated. In this vision the state is but one of many group personalities rather than the Sovereign Person that absorbs all. This approach was asserted by the 'Pluralists'. 144 For them, the real existence of groups is also the source of their legal personality, but the State does not absorb all legal persons within society, nor does it merge and devour individuals into the divine State Person. The state is merely one of many groups, which all have legal personality based on their actual existence. My suggestion to revisit realist theory is not an argument for reviving the old version nor the political interpretation given to Gierke's theory.
Rather I aim to explore the old idea that legal personality emerges from 'real' existence so as to find leads for the development of a new, modern version of real personality theory.
b. Revisiting the realist theory of (international) legal personality
In 1926, John Dewey wrote a firm defence of fiction theory and made a decisive contribution to the end of the debate on legal personality, which had waged heavily since arguably the early 1880s [W]hatever the Roman universitas may have been -and Dr Gierke is for pinning the Roman jurists to Savignianism -our German Fellowship [Genossenshaft] is no fiction, no symbol, no piece of the State's machinery, no collective name for individuals, but a living organism and a real person, with body and members and a will of its own. Itself can will, itself can act; it wills and acts by the men who are its organs as a man wills and acts by brain, mouth and hand. It is not a fictitious person; it is a Gesammtperson, and its will is a Gesammtwille; it is a group-person, and its will is a group-will. 150 Genossenshaft is used to describe composed, super-individual entities as diverse as companies, cities, churches, unions, and so on. In Gierke's theory of legal personality corporation is declared as "reale Gesammtperson nicht bloß rechtsfähig, sondern auch willens und handlungsfähig". 151 The legal person that emerges from the social constellation is thus a real person constituted by, but more than, its members. It has its own capacity to bear rights and obligations, to act and to decide freely. As such, it has 'real' existence without having physical or material existence. Rights and obligations of the Group-persons are inherent to the nature of these persons, they do not lose them being part of the state. They have moral personality (being an organised group that can act and express a will) and legal personality. 152 Law applies to Genossenshaften as it applies to man, yet law creates neither.
In Gierke's theory, the non-state actors -they are what Gierke calls Genossenshaften -that have these capacities are indeed legal persons due to their actual Dasein and not due to the law of the state. Gierke approaches the legal personality of the state in the same way. 153 The factual existence of a state is the source of its (international) legal personality. The community of communities from which the legal personality of the state emerges, is an entity with a life and will of its own. In other words, there is ample room for group life within the state; neither individuals nor collective non-state entities are completely subsumed by the state and therewith lose their identity and autonomy. In this view the state needs the groups living within it, and without these individuals and collective entities will not be able to take shape. Hence, the real personality of the state (which generates from its community) precedes and gives birth to its (international) legal personality. State or non-state, the legal person is a conscious and willful metaphysical person, a super-individual being with a life, mind, and will of its own. 154 Gierke's and Maitland's challenge to individualism in legal theory was connected to the rise of powerful collective entities such as commercial corporations and labour unions in the context of industrialization. Society was changing rapidly and they felt it should be possible to hold these new powerful actors to account. Others however used the realist theory to accomplish the contrary, that is: no regulation of companies by the state. This was one of the reasons for intense debate on corporate personality at the turn of the century. 155 In short, the realist position conceived of legal personality as rooted in social(-political) and moral life.
In 'reality' is worth discussing. We will get to this in 4c.
Secondly, the 'old' realist theory described above may also be read as an attempt to make According to the old version of the realist theory, the common nature or essence of all legal persons -whether an individual or collective actor, and whether a state or NSA -can be found in the capacity to will and to act. In case of a collective entity, these pre-judicial capacities are born from what Gierke termed 'fellowship' among the group members, they require a group that is wellorganised around a purpose and with a 'mind' or 'conscience' of its own. Its 'reality' shows from its actions as one and independent of its members. In these postmodern and post-postmodern days, 158 personality, the social substratum of the legal person is conceived of as a 'collectivity,' i.e. "the self-description of a (usually formally) organized action system that brings about a cyclical linkage of self-referentially constituted system identity and action." The internal dynamics of the social substratum is conceived as "an autonomous communicative process with actual people simply being treated as part of this process' environment." In Teubner's vocabulary, the substratum of the legal person is an "autopoietic social system" which is a system of actions/communications that "reproduces itself by constantly producing from the network of its elements new communications/actions as elements." The capacity for action and reflexive communication is the qualifying characteristic of the social substratum of the legal person. Hence, the (international) legal person "is 'fictional' because it is not identical with the real organization but only with the semantics of its self-description." However, "it is 'real' because this fiction takes on structural effect and orients social actions by binding them collectively." 164 The collectivity is more than an idea in the brain of people involved, the hard reality of the collectivity is constituted by communicative self-description in the action system. It produces moreover the qualifying capacity of collective action and constitution of self-referential identity.
Social constructivist Alexander Wendt resumed the discussion on personhood of states in international theory a few years ago. 165 Wendt too aimed to move beyond the old metaphysical metaphors and atomizing reduction of the state person, in order to find a conception of personhood that can stand the tests of the latest philosophical, political and social sciences insights. In this exploration of personhood focus is on the state, but this is a matter of choice rather than principle. Wendt's analysis of how states are socially constructed within the international system is an IR disciplinary choice. After all, IR literature and its political realism is a "states systemic project." Yet, he notes that a discourse on the social construction of other important (non-state) actors such as MNCs and NGOs might be equally needed to explain contemporary world politics. 166 Social constructivism as a method is not prescribing which actors to study. 167 International NSAs and international law as the structure in which they are embedded can be studied well from a social constructivist perspective too. 168 We may learn something from Wendt's examination of the (psychological) personhood of the state about personhood of international actors more generally. Wendt identifies three conceptions of personhood: (1) being an intention system, (2) being an organism, and (3) the even thicker conception of having consciousness. The second and third sense are not required in 164 Gunther Teubner, at 138. Emphasis added. 165 Elsewhere, I have proposed the reconstitution of ILP of the individual and the collective self "as moral identity constituted in the dialectic relation of Self and Other(nes)s." I will not repeat myself here. At this point the proposition is to revive the ILP theory debate and to examine how a new generation realist theory may help us move beyond the state vs non-state dichotomy.
Conclusion
The conclusion to this chapter can be brief. The claim that NSAs have or should have international legal personality (ILP) for the sake of an international rule of law is ever more widely accepted. This claim in turn hinges on the -increasingly accepted -idea that any international actor with factual (social, economic or political) power should also have legal visibility. Such legal visibility can effectively be formalized through the tool of 'international legal personality'. These considerations have rekindled the debate on ILP. This chapter suggests that the prevailing 'fiction theory' on ILP is no longer fitting for the current state of affairs and that legal personality would need grounding in a social, political and/or economic reality. I have argued that it is worth to re-visit the 'real personality' or 'realist' theory on legal personality and to examine whether and how a new generation of this approach can be developed on the basis of contemporary scientific insights on what is 'real' when it comes to collective actors. If we can identify a set of (pre-legal) capacities required by a social reality in order for legal personality to emerge, we may be able to move beyond the current state -non-state dichotomy in ILP theory.
In order to set the stage for the much-needed debate on ILP theory and the social grounding of legal personality, this chapter has touched upon the theories of Teubner and Wendt. Read together with the reconceptualisation of ILP as a stage of the ethical-moral identity of the individual or collective subject, these approaches suggest that the new realist theory debate need no longer be hindered by the (in)famous organicist legacy of Otto von Gierke, but may profit from the latest insights in philosophy, (social) psychology, sociology. It could be added that a modern version of a 'capacity approach', which includes the capacity for responsibility and accountability, could actually be quite helpful when it comes to the constitution of NSAs as legal persons in international law.
